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CORE EXISTENCE IN VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED MARKETS*
JEAN J. GABSZEWICZ, MARCO A. MARINI AND ORNELLA TAROLA
Abstract. We prove that a su¢ cient condition for the core existence in a n-rm verti-
cally di¤erentiated market is that the qualities of rmsproducts are equispaced along the
quality spectrum. This result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among
rms in such markets is more easily reachable when product qualities are not distributed
too asymmetrically along the quality ladder.
Keywords: Vertically Di¤erentiated Markets, Price Collusion, Core, Grand Coalition,
Coalition Stability, Games with Externalities, Partition Function Games.
JEL Classication: D42, D43, L1, L12, L13, L41.
1. Introduction
The main aim of this note is to prove that a su¢ cient - albeit not necessary - condition
for the core existence in a partition function game associated to a n-rm version of the
classical vertically di¤erentiated market (e.g., Mussa and Rosen 1978, Gabszewicz and Thisse
1979,1980) is that the qualities of products sold by the rms are equispaced along the quality
spectrum. In addition, we show that, when this regularity condition is relaxed, the core can
be easily empty.
There exist very few contributions dealing with the existence of core in oligopoly games
with heterogeneous rms.1 Our result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement
among rms in such markets is more easily reachable when the product qualities are not
distributed too asymmetrically along the quality ladder.
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Given that the vertical di¤erentiated market is a setting with strategic interdependence,
the most appropriate coalitional game derived from it is a game in partition function (Thrall
and Lucas 1963). This in line with the recent interest in coalitional games with externalities
(see, e.g., Maskin 2003, Ray 2007, Hafalir 2007, de Clippel and Serrano 2008, Bloch and van
den Nouweland 2014, Ray and Vohra 2015). It is well known that, when externalities are
at work across coalitions, the use of a coalitional worth requires some assumptions on the
expected behaviour of players outside every deviating coalition. In such cases, core alloca-
tions may fail to exist even in convex games, for instance when players in the complementary
coalition are expected to remain together, as in the delta core (Hart and Kurz 1983), also
denoted projection core in the recent axiomatization by Bloch and van den Nouweland 2014.
Moreover, since in the case of vertically di¤erentiated markets the coalitional worth pos-
sesses positive coalition externalities,2 the delta or projection-core is the smallest core and,
therefore, its existence implies the existence of all other possible versions of core in games
with simultaneous moves. In this paper, we use this notion of core to provide the strongest
existence result for the class of games considered here.
2. Vertically Differentiated Market
Let n rms i = 1; 2; :::; n o¤er n quality variants q1; q2; :::; qn, respectively, with qi 2 (0;1)
and qn > qn 1 > ::: > q1 to a population of consumers. As in Mussa and Rosen (1978)
consumers are indexed by  and uniformly distributed in the interval [0; ], with  <1. As
usual, the parameter  captures consumerswillingness to pay for quality. Each consumer
can either buy one unit of a variant or not buying at all. Formally, consumers utility is
given by
(2.1) U() =

qi   pi when buying variant i
0 when not buying,
where pi 2 [0; p] with 0 < p <1 is the price charged by rm i for its variant qi. From the
above formulation, the marginal consumer buying variant i = 1 is
1 =
p1
q1
;
and the market is uncovered, with some consumers excluded from buying even the bottom-
quality variant. In general, the consumer indi¤erent between buying variant i   1 and i is,
for i = 2; 3; :::; n
i =
pi   pi 1
qi   qi 1 ;
with pi > pi 1. When considering price competition, the payo¤s of all rms can be easily
characterized by the payo¤ of three types of rms in the quality spectrum: (i) top quality
(ii) intermediate quality and (iii) bottom quality rm. Since in the model product qualities
are exogenously given, we disregard costs to simplify calculations.3 The top quality rm
(denoted i = n) sets a price pn maximizing its prot
(2.2) n =

   pn   pn 1
qn   qn 1

pn;
2This means that every rm is advantaged when rivals merge in coalitions.
3It can be shown that the presence of quality-dependent xed costs does not change the nature of the
results obtained here.
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whereas every intermediate rm i = 2; 3; :::; n  1 selects a price pi to maximize
(2.3) i =

pi+1   pi
qi+1   qi  
pi   pi 1
qi   qi 1

pi:
Finally, the bottom quality rm (i = 1), sets a price p1 to maximize
(2.4) 1 =

p2   p1
q2   q1  
p1
q1

p1:
Note that, from (2.2)-(2.4), rmsprot functions are continuous and concave in their
own prices. Moreover, rmschoice sets are compact and convex and best-replies are con-
tractions,4 so the existence of a unique (noncooperative) Nash equilibrium n-price vector
p associated to the n variants (q1; q2; :::; qn) is guaranteed for any (nite) number of rms
competing in the market.5Moreover, the optimal reply of every rm is given by
(2.6) pn(pn 1) = pn 1 +

2
(qn   qn 1)
for the top-quality rm (i = n)
(2.7) pi(pi 1; p+1) =
pi 1(qi+1   qi) + pi+1(qi   qi 1)
(qi+1   qi 1) ;
for all intermediate rms i = 2; 3; :::; (n  1) and
(2.8) p1(p2) = 
q1
q2
p2
for the bottom-quality rm i = 1, where  =  = 1=2 at the noncooperative equilibrium,
 =  = 1 both under full collusion and when a rm lies inside a coalition of rms, and
 = 1=2 and  = 1 (or  = 1 and  = 1=2) when a rm competes with its left (right)
neighbour and colludes with its right (left) neighbour. This implies that every rm benets
from rivalscartelisation and the coalitional worth (joint prot) of rms exhibits positive
coalitional externalities: from (2.6)-(2.8) it ensues that all rmsoptimal replies are positively
sloped and their slope increases with (partial or full) collusion. Thus, rivalscartelisation
increases all rmsprices and, hence, their payo¤s.
2.1. Grand Coalition Payo¤. When all rms form a cartel they maximize the sum of
rmspayo¤s. As shown in Gabszewicz et al. (2016), under full price collusion all rms set
prices pci such that their market shares are nil for all rms but the top-quality one (i = n).
This is is easy to show. Using (2.6)-(2.8) with  =  = 1 for all rms, the following price is
obtained
(2.9) pci =
1
2

P
ji
j;
4A su¢ cient condition for the contraction property to hold is (see, for instance, Vives 2000, p.47):
@2i
@ (pi)
2 +
P
j 6=i
 @2i@pi@pj
 < 0;
which, using (2.3) for all intermediate rms i = 2; :::; n  1, becomes
(2.5)   2 (qi+1   qi 1)
(qi+1   qi) (qi   qi 1) +
qi+1   qi 1
(qi+1   qi) (qi   qi 1) =
qi 1   qi+1
(qi+1   qi) (qi   qi 1) < 0
which is respected for qn > qn 1 > ::: > q1. The same applies for top and bottom quality rms.
5See, for instance Friedman (1991), p.84.
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where j = (qj   qj 1) is the quality gap of every rm j selling goods of lower or equal
quality than rm i, and 1 = (q1   q0) = q1. Inserting (2.9) in every rms market share Di,
we obtain:
D1(p
c
1; p
c
2) =

pc2   pc1
2
  p
c
1
1

=
 1
2
 (1 + 2)  121
2
 
1
2
1
1

= 0
for the bottom quality rm,
Di(p
c
i 1; p
c
i ; p
c
i+1) =

pci+1   pci
i+1
  p
c
i   pci 1
i 1

=
=

1
2

P
ji+1 j  12
P
ji j
i+1
 
1
2

P
ji j  12
P
ji 1 j
i 1

=
=

1
2
i+1
i+1
  12i
i

= 0:
for any intermediate quality rm, and
Dn(p
c
n 1; p
c
n) =

   p
c
n   pcn 1
qn   qn 1

=

  
1
2

P
jn j  12
P
jn 1 j
n

=
=

   12n
n

=
1
2
;
for the top quality rm. Thus, when colluding together all rms cover only half of the market
and the grand coalition payo¤ is:
(2.10) v(N) =
P
i2N

fNg
i =
nP
i=1
piDi =
1
4
2qn:
2.2. Coalitional Payo¤s. The n rms can also collude organizing themselves in partition
P = (S1; S2; :::; Sm) di¤erent from the grand coalition. Every rm can actively collude in
prices only with its left (lower quality), with its right (higher quality) or with both its closest
competitors by forming bottom, intermediate or top quality cartels.6
Denition 1. (i) A bottom cartel SB  N is a coalition formed by consecutive intermediate
rms i = 2; :::; n  1 also including the bottom quality rm i = 1. (ii) An intermediate cartel
SI  N is a coalition only formed by consecutive intermediate rms i = 2; :::; n  1. (iii) A
top cartel ST  N is a coalition formed by consecutive intermediate rms i = 2; :::; n   1,
also including the top quality rm i = n.
In the next proposition, we characterize the variants produced by the rms belonging to:
(i) an intermediate cartel; (ii) a bottom cartel; (iii) a top cartel.
Proposition 1. (i) A bottom cartel only produces in equilibrium the top quality variant
among those formerly produced by its rms. (ii) Any intermediate cartel only produces
in equilibrium the top and the bottom quality variants among those formerly produced by
its rms. (iii) Any top cartel only produces in equilibrium the top and the bottom quality
variants among those formerly produced by its rms.
Proof. See Gabszewicz et al. (2016). 
6Without forming cartels among consecutive rms, i.e producing adjacent variants rmscollusion does
not a¤ect price behaviour.
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Proposition 1 enables to characterize the number of variants marketed by the rms in any
feasible partition P = (S1; S2; :::; Sm) for m  n and will be used extensively to prove the
main paper result.
3. Core stability
This section analyses the stability of full price collusion, i.e. the situation in which all
rms in the industry collude in prices. In particular, the next proposition shows that, when
all rmsquality variants are equispaced (i.e. spaced at equal distance), it is always possible
to nd a division of the monopoly prot which makes the whole industry cartel stable against
individual or coalitional deviations by rms.
We can formally associate to the described vertically di¤erentiated market a partition
function game G = (N; v (S;P )), where N is the set of rms and v(S;P ) : 2N  P ! R
is the worth associated to every coalition of rms S  N embedded in a partition P 2 P,
where P is the set of all feasible partitions of the N rms. We can now dene the core of a
partition function game.
Denition 2. A vector of payo¤s x = (x1; x2; :::; xn) with
P
i2N xi = v(N) is in the core of
the partition function game G if, for every S  N and every partition P in which S can be
embedded,
P
i2S xi  v (S;P ).
We are now ready to prove our main result:
Proposition 2. Let market variants q1; q2; :::; qn be equispaced with (qi   qi 1) =  2 (0;1)
for every i = 1; 2; :::; n, and q0 = 0. Then, the core of the partition function game G
associated to the n-rm vertically di¤erentiated market is nonempty.
Proof. In our model of vertical di¤erentiation, when a coalition of rms S  N forms, its
maximal coalitional payo¤ is obtained when the remaining rms inN S stick together in the
complementary coalition fN   Sg. Therefore, if the core is nonempty when the coalitional
worth v(S;P ) is computed for P = fS;N   Sg, it will a fortiori be nonempty under any
other partition P 2 P in which S can be embedded. For this reason, in what follows, we
only need to prove that there exists an allocation x = (x1; x2; :::; xn) of the grand coalition
payo¤ v(N) such that, for all S  N , Pi2S xi  v (S; fS;N   Sg). In particular, we prove
this result by constructing a specic allocation respecting this requirement. Since the payo¤
obtained by every rm i in partition P = fi; N   ig is crucial to build such allocation, let us
start from it. We consider rst the payo¤of the top quality rm (denoted i = n), in partition
P = fn;N   ng. In this case, by Proposition 1, only two variants remain on sale, qn from
rm n and qn 1 from the remaining rms merged in the bottom cartel SB = fN   ng. As a
result, in the new equilibrium under equispaced variants7
(3.1) v(n; fn;N   ng) = fn;N ngn =
42q2n (qn   qn 1)
(4qn   qn 1)2
=
42n2
(3n+ 1)2
:
As a second step, let us consider the payo¤ of the bottom-quality rm in partition P =
f1; N   1g. By Proposition 1, in this case only three variants remain on sale, q1, q2 and qn,
where q2 and qn are o¤ered by the rms merged in the top cartel ST = fN   1g. In this new
7That is, for (q1   q0) = (q2   q1) = :: = (qn   qn 1) = , and, hence, q1 = ; q2 = 2; :::; qn = n:
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equilibrium, the payo¤ obtained by rm i = 1 is
(3.2) v(1; f1; N   1g) = f1;N 1g1 =
2q1q2 (q2   q1)
(4q2   q1)2
=
22
49
:
Finally, let us consider the payo¤ obtained by every intermediate rm i = 2; :::; n   1 in
partition P = fSB; i; STg, where SB and ST are the bottom and top cartel neighbouring rm
i. In this case, at most four variants remain on sale, namely qi 1 from SB, qi from i and qi+1
and qn from ST , yielding:
(3.3) v (i; fi; N   ig) = fi;N igi =
q2i 
2 (qi   qi 1) (qi+1   qi) (qi+1   qi 1)
(2qi 1qi + qi 1qi+1   4qiqi+1 + q2i )2
=
2(i)2
(6i+ 1)2
:
Now, using (2.10) and (3.1)-(3.3) it is easy to see that, under equispaced variants, inequality
v(N)  v(1; f1; N   1g) +
n 1X
i=2
v (i; fi; N   ig) + v(n; fn;N   ng);
writes as
(3.4)
n
4
 2
49
+
n 1X
i=2
(i)2
(6i+ 1)2
+
4n2
(3n+ 1)2
;
and the latter expression holds with strict inequality for any number of rms n  2.
Let us now construct a specic allocation bx = (bx1; bx2; :::; bxn) assigning to every rm i =
1; 2; :::; n a share si of the grand coalition payo¤ v(N) equal to
si =
v (i; fi; N   ig)P
i2N v (i; fi; N   ig)
;
such that
P
i2N si = 1, that is
(3.5) bx = (s1v(N); s2v(N); :::; snv(N)) :
Thus, since (3.4) holds with strict inequality, it ensues that for every rm i = 1; 2; :::; n
bxi = siv(N) > si nP
i=1
v (i; fi; N   ig) = v (i; fi; N   ig) ;
implying that the selected allocation bx 2Rn is robust against any individual rms deviations.
As a second step, we need to look at the payo¤ obtained by any feasible coalition of
rms. Let us assume again that every forming coalition expects the remaining rms to stick
together in the complementary coalition (delta or projection expectations). As a result, when
a coalition of rms in a bottom cartel SB  N forms under partition P = fSB; N   SBg, by
Proposition 1 only variants qh; qh+1 and qn remain on sale (qh from SB and qh+1 and qn from
fN   SBg), where qh denotes the highest quality variant in SB. The worth of any bottom
cartel SB is, therefore,
(3.6)
v (SB; fSB; N   SBg) =
P
i2SB
i = h=maxfigi2SB =
2qhqh+1 (qh+1   qh)
(4qh+1   qh)2
=
2h (h+ 1)
(3h+ 4)2
:
From (3.5) and (3.6), for every SB  N inequalityX
i2SB
bxi  v (SB; fSB; N   SBg)
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writes, under equispaced variants, as
(3.7)
2
49
+
hX
i=2
(i)2
(6i+1)2
2
49
+
n 1X
i=2
(i)2
(6i+1)2
+ 4n
2
(3n+1)2
n
4
 h (h+ 1)
(3h+ 4)2
;
and (3.7) holds with strict inequality for every number of rms n and for every h = 2; :::n 1.
Expression (3.7) ensures that no bottom cartel SB can improve upon
P
i2SB bxi, the joint
payo¤ assigned by allocation bx 2Rn to members of SB.
When, in turn, a top cartel ST  N forms under partition P = fST ; N   STg, only three
variants remain on sale, ql 1 from N   ST and ql and qn from ST , for l denoting the lowest
quality rm in ST . Hence, under equispaced variants,
v(ST ; fST ; N   STg) =
P
i2ST

fST ;N ST g
i = l=minfigi2ST +n =
=
2qlql 1 (ql   ql 1)
(4ql   ql 1)2
+
1
4
2 (4qlqn   ql 1qn   3ql 1ql)
(4ql   ql 1) =
=
2l(l + 1)
(3l + 4)2
+
1
4
2 (3l + n+ 3l  n  3l2)
(3l + 1)
:
Note that this expression is decreasing in l, since the highest l the smaller is the size of the
top cartel ST . Now, for every ST  N ,X
i2ST
bxi  v (ST ; fST ; N   STg)
under equispaced variants corresponds to
n 1X
i=l
(i)2
(6i+1)2
+ 4n
2
(3n+1)2
2
49
+
n 1X
i=2
(i)2
(6i+1)2
+ 4n
2
(3n+1)2
n
4
 l(l + 1)
(3l + 4)2
+
1
4
(3l + n+ 3l  n  3l2)
(3l + 1)
;
which holds with strict inequality for every number of rms n and every l = 2; :::n   1.
Finally, when an intermediate cartel SI  N forms under partition P = fSB; SI ; STg, by
Proposition 1 at most ve variants remain on sale: ql 1 from SB, ql and qh from SI , and qh+1
and qn from ST , where, in turn, l and h stands for the lowest and highest quality rms in
cartel SI . The payo¤ obtainable by an intermediate cartel is, therefore,
v(SI ; fSB; SI ; STg) = fSB ;SI ;ST gSI =
42ql 1ql (ql   ql 1) (qh+1   qh)2
(ql 1qh   9ql 1ql   4ql 1qh+1   4qlqh + 16qlqh+1)2
+
+
2 (qh+1   qh) (4qlqh+1   3ql 1ql   ql 1qh+1) (4qlqh   ql 1qh   3ql 1ql)
(ql 1qh   9ql 1ql   4ql 1qh+1   4qlqh + 16qlqh+1)2
;
that, under equispaced variants, can be written as

fSB ;SI ;ST g
SI
=
1
16
2 (3l2   6l   3hl   h  1) (3l2   3l   3hl   h)
(h+ 5l + 2hl   2l2 + 1)2 +
2 (l   1) l
4 (3h+ 21l + 9hl   9l2 + 4)2 :
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Thus, for every SI  N X
i2SI
bxi  v (SI ; fSI ; N   SIg)
is
hX
i=l

(i)2
(6i+1)2

2
49
+
n 1X
i=2

(i)2
(6i+1)2

+ 4n
2
(3n+1)2
n
4
 1
16
(3l2 6l 3hl h 1)(3l2 3l 3hl h)
(h+5l+2hl 2l2+1)2 +
(l 1)l
4(3h+21l+9hl 9l2+4)2 ;
which, again, holds for any number of rms n and for any l = 2; :::n  2 and h = 3; :::; n  1,
with l < h. As a result, the selected allocation bx distributes the grand coalition payo¤ in a
way that no coalition of rms S  N can, by leaving the grand coalition N , obtain a better
payo¤. The core is, therefore, nonempty. 
3.1. Endogenous Qualities. It can be shown that, when N = f1; 2; 3g, the core is non-
empty also when rms are allowed to select endogenously both qualities and prices. Following
Gabszewicz et al. (2015), the grand coalition sets endogenously a product quality qfNg = 0:25
and, hence, v(N) = 0:03125, which is su¢ cient to prevent individual deviations, given that:
v(N) = 0:03125 > v(1; f1; 23g)+v(2; f2; 13g)+v(3; f12; 3g) = 0:00152+0:00152+0:02443:
Moreover, there exist allocations x = (x1; x2; x3) distributing v(N) in such a way that no
coalition S  N , by selecting its optimal quality and price, has an incentive to deviate. Using
our sharing rule s = (s1; s2; s3) = (0:0533; 0:0533; 0:8893), we obtain thatX
i2f1;2g
bxi = 0:0033 > v (12; f12; 3g) = 0:00152;X
i2f1;3g
bxi = 0:0945 > v (13; f13; 2g) = 0:02443;X
i2f2;3g
bxi = 0:0945 > v (23; f1; 23g) = 0:02443;
and the core is, therefore, nonempty. However, it can be shown that, with only three rms,
the nonemptiness of core always holds for any distribution of product qualities. For core
emptiness to arise, the presence in the market of at least four rms are required, as the next
example will show.
3.2. An Empty Core Example. Let us consider the case of four rms selling four di¤erent
variants q1, q2, q3 and q4. In this case, if the top cartel ST = f234g decides to leave the
grand coalition fNg and partition P = f1; 234g forms, it gains:
v((234) ; f1; 234g) = (f1g;f2;3;4g)234 =
2q2q3 (q3   q2)
(4q3   q2)2
+
1
4
2 (4q2q4   q1q4   3q1q2)
(4q2   q1) ;
while rm 1 obtains
v(1; f1; 234g) = f1;234g1 =
2q1q2 (q2   q1)
(4q2   q1)2
:
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Note that, for  = 1, q1 = 1, q2 = 5 and q4 = 10 and q3 > 7: 26, the quality gap between q2
and q3 (both produced inside the cartel) becomes su¢ ciently high for

f1;234g
1 +
f1;234g
234 > 
fNg
N = v(N) =
1
4
2q4 = 2:5
and the core is, as a result, empty. If, instead, products are equispaced, with q1 = 2:5,
q2 = 5, q3 = 7:5 and q4 = 10,

f1;234g
1 +
f1;234g
234 = 2:21 < 
fNg
N
and also the other deviations by single or coalitions of rms cannot in any way improve upon
the grand coalition payo¤. Core existence is, in such a way, re-established.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that in a vertically di¤erentiated market when the variants
marketed by the rms are equispaced, a fully collusive agreement in prices is core-stable.
When this regularity condition is relaxed, the core can be easily empty.
5. Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 3. (i) A bottom cartel only produces in equilibrium the top quality variant
among those formerly produced by its rms. (ii) Any intermediate cartel only produces
in equilibrium the top and the bottom quality variants among those formerly produced by
its rms. (iii) Any top cartel only produces in equilibrium the top and the bottom quality
variants among those formerly produced by its rms.
Proof. (Gabszewicz et al. 2016). We rst prove (ii) and then the proof easily extends to (iii)
and, with slight modications, to (i).Take a generic intermediate cartel SI  N made of k
rms, with k  jN   2j. Before the cartel is formed, these rms are selling variants denoted
(qi; qi+1; qi+2; :::; qi+k) and competing with, in turn, a left-hand fringe of independent rms
selling lower quality variants q1; q2; :::; qi 1, and with a righ-hand fringe selling higher quality
variants qi+k+1; qi+k+2; :::; qn. The optimal-replies of rms in the cartel can be written as,
respectively,
pi(pi 1; pi+1) =
1
2
pi 1(qi+1   qi) + pi+1(qi   qi 1)
(qi+1   qi 1)
pi+1(pi; pi+2) =
pi(qi+2   qi+1) + pi+2(qi+1   qi)
(qi+2   qi)
pi+2(pi+1; pi+3) =
pi+1(qi+3   qi+2) + pi+3(qi+2   qi+1)
(qi+3   qi+1)
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
pi+k(pi+k 1; pi+k+1) =
pi+k 1(qi+k+1   qi+k) + 12pi+k+1 (qi+k   qi+k 1)
qi+k+1   qi+k 1 ;
where only the two extreme rms i and i + k in the cartel are directly competing with
rms outside. Without loss of generality, take a generic rm inside the cartel selling an
intermediate variant (i.e neither the bottom nor the top quality in the cartel), say rm i+1.
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Using both the optimal reply of rm i+1 and those of the rms connected to it (i.e. rms i
and i + 2) and re-arranging, we obtain the optimal replies of these three rms as functions
of pi 1 and pi+3 only.
~pi = pi(pi 1; pi+3) =
1
2
pi 1 (qi+3   qi) + 2pi+3(qi   qi 1)
qi+3   qi 1 ;
~pi+1 = pi+1(pi 1; pi+3) =
1
2
pi 1(qi+3   qi+1) + 2pi+3(qi+1   qi 1)
qi+3   qi 1 ;
~pi+2 = pi+2(pi 1; pi+3) =
1
2
pi 1(qi+3   qi+2) + 2pi+3(qi+2   qi 1)
qi+3   qi 1 :
Using the above, we can easily compute the optimal market share of rm (i+ 1) as
Di+1(~pi; ~pi+1; ~pi+2) =
~pi+2   ~pi+1
qi+2   qi+1  
~pi+1   ~pi
qi+1   qi = 0
which proves that under partial collusion every intermediate rm of an intermediate cartel
obtains zero market share. Repeating now the same procedure for the rm producing the
lowest quality in the cartel (here rm i), we obtain instead that
Di(~pi; ~pi+1; ~pi 1) =
~pi+1   ~pi
qi+1   qi  
~pi   ~pi 1
qi   qi 1 =
1
2
~pi 1
(qi   qi 1) > 0
for ~pi 1 > 0. Finally, computing the optimal replies of the highest quality rm in the cartel,
i.e. rm (i+ k), and of the rms directly connected to it, we obtain
~pi+k 1(pi+k 2; pi+k) =
pi+k 2(qi+k 1   qi+k 2) + pi+k (qi+k 1   qi+k 2)
qi+k   qi+k 2
~pi+k(pi+k 1; pi+k+1) =
pi+k 1(qi+k+1   qi+k) + 12pi+k+1 (qi+k   qi+k 1)
qi+k+1   qi+k 1
~pi+k+1(pi+k; pi+k+2) =
1
2
pi+k(qi+k+2   qi+k+1) + pi+k+2 (qi+k+1   qi+k)
qi+k+2   qi+k :
Using the above,
Di+k(~pi+k 1; ~pi+k; ~pi+k+1) =
~pi+k+1   ~pi+k
qi+k+1   qi+k  
~pi+k   ~pi+k 1
qi+k   qi+k 1 =
=
1
2
~pi+k+1
(qi+k   qi+k 1) > 0.
showing that only the variants produced by the two rms at the extremes of this (generic)
intermediate cartel are sold at prices implying positive market shares.
(iii) Exactly the same procedure can be replicated to prove that, in a top cartel ST  N
only the highest and lowest quality variants initially sold by the cartel remain on sale. (i)
Finally, let us consider a bottom cartel SB  N , i.e. a cartel formed by rms 1; 2; :::; k
initially selling k variants q1; q2; ::::qk and competing with (n  k) independent rms selling
higher quality variants qk+1; qk+2; :::; qn. Again, we can apply the same argument used above
to show that every rm in the interior of the cartel (i.e neither selling its lowest quality
nor its highest quality variant in the cartel) obtains zero market share. Also, for the top
quality rm in the cartel (here rm k), we obtain that Dk(~pk; ~pk 1; ~pk+1) > 0: Finally, when
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considering the rm selling the lowest quality variant in the bottom cartel, its market share
is:
D1(p2; p1) =
p2   p1
q2   q1  
p1
q1
= 0;
that, by simply substituting rm 1 optimal reply
p1(p2) =
q1
q2
p2
becomes
D1(p2; ~p1) =
p2   q1q2p2
q2   q1  
q1
q2
p2
q1
= 0;
showing that, di¤erently from all other cartels, the bottom cartel only produces its top-quality
variant qk. 
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